This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory -a society's vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts.
Introduction
"In 1989, the Serbs commemorated their defeat at the hands of the Turks in the Battle of Blackbird Field, in 1389, and it formed the starting point for the Balkans wars of the 1990s." - Baumeister and Hastings (1997) .
The "memories" that induced such a destructive war were obviously not direct. Instead, they were shaped by oral or written accounts of history that were passed on through the generations. This paper develops a model in which destructive behavior can arise from this type of indirect memory, which social scientists in various fields refer to as social memory.
One commonly accepted definition, given by Crumley (2002) , describes social memory as "the means by which information is transmitted among individuals and groups and from one generation to another. Not necessarily aware that they are doing so, individuals pass on their behaviors and attitudes to others in various contexts but especially through emotional and practical ties and in relationships among generations [.. 
.]"
The definition is obviously neutral about how social memory is used.
1 This paper develops a model that shows how social memory, specifically incorrect social memory in the face of contrary physical evidence, is instrumental in creating and perpetuating destructive conflict.
Clearly, not all conflicts are universally destructive. Some yield clear winners and losers.
Indeed, there is a long history of strategic models of war and conflict in this vein dating back at least to Schelling (1960) . Some recent models, for instance Schwarz and Sonin (2007) , Jackson and Morelli (2008) , Chassang and i Miguel (2008) , and Yared (2009) , are rooted in the theory of repeated and/or dynamic games. Others such as Fearon (1995) and Glaeser (2005) place conflict in a signalling context. 2 A typical characteristic of the literature is that there may be positive incentives for conflict in some states of the world by at least one social stratum that stands to gain from what is an overall destructive conflict with another group or society.
Our interest in this paper, however, is in conflicts that are known to have no winners at all;
conflicts that are so destructive that existing theories have trouble explaining them. Hence, 1 Fields in which social memory is commonly studied include anthropology, psychology, and distributed cognition. See, for instance, Cattell and Climo (2002) , Connerton (1989) , Crumley (2002) , Fentress and Wickham (1992) , Pennebaker, Paez, and Rimè (1997) , Rogers (1997) and Sutton (2005) .
2 Overall, the literature on war and conflict is immense and impossible to do justice here. However, see Yared (2009) for an excellent bibliography. In Section 5 we discuss those models of conflict that, like ours, have some element of intergenerational memory or communication.
standard repeated games are less useful for our purposes since they only sustain "moderately bad" outcomes, i.e., outcomes above the stage game minmax payoff. In this sense, repeated game models of war afford each participant a modicum of self protection. Similarly, signalling games are limited in that they require agents to assign large likelihood to objective states of the world in which the conflict is desirable from at least one country's point of view. Yet in some conflicts, World War I being a case in point, decision makers are often aware at the outset that the hostilities are extremely undesirable for all concerned. Foley (2005) makes this argument plainly.
Rather than dismissing these models, the present paper attempts to expand them in a way that can accommodate a role for social memory in conflicts. We therefore posit a model that abstracts away from scenarios in which there are positive incentives for conflict.
Consider a game faced by two nations each period in which all out conflict is catastrophically bad for all involved in a way that everyone understands. For concreteness, we call these nations F (France) and G (Germany). These countries are engaged in a repeated Game of Conflict. In a Game of Conflict, there are three types of "peaceful" profiles, and one exceedingly "destructive" action profile. The peace profiles come in three varieties. One that is good for both sides ("cooperation"), one that is bad for one side and good for the other ("domination" by one country over the other), and a third one in which domination by one side over the other is reversed. The "destructive" action profile takes both countries below their "individually rational" (minmax) payoff levels in the stage game. We refer to this profile as "all out war." Our main result demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium in which all out war occurs with arbitrarily high frequency.
Clearly, if these countries are thought of as unitary actors with perfect memory, then the aforementioned equilibrium could not occur since it would take each nation's long run payoff below its stage minmax. Instead, we formulate a generational model based loosely on Crumley's notion of social memory. Specifically, each nation in this conflict is a "dynasty,"
i.e., a placeholder for a sequence of individual decision makers, each of whom is finitely lived but cares about what happens to future generations who inhabit the same nation-dynasty.
Families, tribes, and ethnic groups are all ongoing entities with similar features. We initially focus attention on a canonical case of one-period lived individuals, however we later extend the results to any demographic structure in which individual lifetimes are uniformly bounded.
At the end of each period, each "stand-in" decision maker observes the realized action profile, then chooses what and how much of his information to pass on to his successor in the dynasty by way of a private message. Each new entrant has no direct memory of the past, but nevertheless forms a belief about it from two possible sources. One is the message about the past -the written or oral historiography of the dynasty -received from his predecessor. The other source is the physical evidence -history's "footprint" -in the form of an informative but imperfect public signal of past events. Social memory is therefore created over time by a combination of evidence and intergenerational communication within dynastic nations.
Our main result demonstrates that if each individual decision maker is sufficiently concerned about the future, then there exists a sequential equilibrium in the dynastic Game of Conflict with the following properties. (1) All out war occurs with arbitrarily high frequency.
(2) Physical evidence is ignored -i.e., neither beliefs nor actions condition on evidence from the past. (3) Social memory following counterfactual histories may be incorrect.
The equilibrium roughly works as follows. On path, behavior cycles deterministically between long periods of war and (relatively) short periods of peace.
3 Along this path, each side's long run payoff is below its stage minmax. This means that even though a self-protective action is available to each nation during the war epoch, it is not chosen. Instead, the equilibrium prescribes that the all out war profile is chosen. In order to rationalize this choice, each decision maker believes that peace-time will be a lot worse for his country if he fails to wage war today.
To understand how such beliefs can occur, consider a deviation by, say F, in which F fails to wage war during the war epoch. In that case the equilibrium prescribes a punishment continuation in which, during the peaceful period, the nations shift from a cooperative peace to a hegemonic one in which G dominates F. This asymmetric peace continues for a short time until the next war epoch, at which point a long phase of all out war resumes.
But why should F follow this prescription when the self-protective (minmax) action is available? It is at this point where the possibility of incorrect social memory is critical.
Recall that the asymmetric peace is off-path, i.e., it occurs only after an initial deviation by a decision maker in F. Furthermore, knowledge of the deviation must be communicated to future decision makers in each country. So, after receiving this out-of-equilibrium message from his predecessor, the future entrant in F must weigh two possibilities. On the one hand, the predecessor's message may be in error -that is, no such action deviation took place.
On the other, the message is correct. A deviation did occur, indicating an action error by a predecessor in F. Each of these possibilities has different implications. If the former is an order of magnitude less likely than the latter, then the current decision maker in F suffers from the illusion that it will not be dominated in the future peace period. In other words, the entrant will not anticipate his own dynasty's punishment. Moreover, F will hold this belief even if the evidence points to the contrary. In short, while F "forgets" that its dynasty has deviated, G does not. Moreover, in the equilibria we construct below, even once the leader of country F realizes his mistake, he is unable to relay this information to F's future leaders who are then doomed to make the same mistake.
A few clarifications may be helpful at this point. First, the equilibrium construction does not depend on anyone's failure to understand the consequences of war. Everyone in this model correctly anticipates that it will be horrific. 4 Rather, what matters is the potential failure of future decision makers to understand the true nature of the error that leads to an off-path message. Because of this, current decision makers are lead to the inescapable conclusion on path that war is necessary. This logic and its important consequences do not hold in standard repeated games with infinitely-lived players.
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Second, the logic is similar to but generally different from a related result that also utilizes dynastic communication. In Anderlini, Gerardi, and Lagunoff (2008) (AGL), it is shown that for certain stage games, any (interior) feasible payoff vector of the stage game can be sustained by a sequential equilibrium in a dynastic game with intra-dynastic communication if the participants place sufficient weight on future generations' payoffs. However, critically, even the least restrictive AGL results apply only to three or more dynasties. By contrast, the present result covers the important, and perhaps more common, case of bilateral conflict. The difference is not just superficial: the construction in AGL makes use of the "large numbers" of participants in a way that cannot be adapted to the current environment. 6 More importantly, 4 The argument is therefore consistent with arguments often made, for instance, about World War I that both German and French leaders were aware in advance of the casualties that the Battle of Verdun would entail -see Foley (2005) .
5 Nor do they hold in overlapping generations games with full memory (Bhaskar, 1998 , Kandori, 1992a , Salant, 1991 , Smith, 1992 .
6 There are two results in AGL, one requiring three or more players, and another which applies to a larger class of stage games requiring four or more players. The first result requires three or more so that unilateral deviations from the equilibrium path can be identified. This is standard in repeated games. The second result the role of evidence and the question of whether it plays any role in swaying beliefs of the participants is not even considered in AGL. The present paper shows that incorrect social memory can be perpetual, even in the face of contrary physical evidence. The logic relies on the fact that messages can in principle convey more information than any imperfect physical evidence. This is because they are sent after the current action profile is observed. It turns out that this is sufficient to make viable equilibria in which physical evidence is ignored, but the messages convey the "wrong" information to future individuals.
To underscore this last point, we examine a variation of the main model in which information is further degraded so that present actions of the rival country are not directly observed. All dynastic members observe the same imperfect evidence about the rival. We show that, in any pure strategy equilibrium, messages would be useless in this case, and so participants would be forced to confront the evidence. The perpetual state of frequent all out war sketched above cannot arise in this case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first set up the model in Section 2.
In Sections 3 and 4 we present our main results. Section 5 examines related literature. We compare our work to other potential explanations of destructive conflicts. Finally, Section 6 concludes. For ease of exposition, some technical material has been relegated to an Appendix.
The Baseline Model
There are two countries -France (F) and Germany (G) -that face off in an infinitely repeated game. We first describe the stage game and posit an explicit demographic structure that defines each nation-dynasty. We then define the strategies, beliefs, and Sequential Equilibrium of this game. Social memory will be shown to be a well defined notion arising naturally from a standard (though perhaps under-appreciated) aspect of Sequential Equilibrium.
A Dynastic Game of Conflict
Though the class of stage games to which our analysis applies is broad, we focus attention on the following symmetric 3 × 3 Game of Conflict. Each country has three feasible actions, {C, D, W }. Restricting attention momentarily to the actions C and D, the game is a version of the Prisoners' dilemma. That is, the payoff, from the point of view of the row player is
. The third action (W ) available to each country is in AGL requires four or more players (dynasties) in order to identify a deviation from among those n − 1 players who carry out the punishment of one player. (1)
Notice that in (1), if F and G were to face off indefinitely and were modeled as standard long-run players with perfect recall, then "very frequent" all out wars could not take place.
This is because, as all out war occurs more and more frequently, the long-run average payoff of both countries approaches −10. But both F and G can guarantee a payoff of at least −8 in every period by unilaterally choosing D.
Our results derive from the assumption that each of the two countries F and G identifies a dynasty. A dynasty is a placeholder for successive generations of individual decision makers.
At any given time, the dynasty is inhabited by one such decision maker who cares about his own payoff and those of future generations within his own dynasty.
For ease of exposition we first restrict attention to a baseline model in which each individual in each dynasty lives one period. This simplifies the notation considerably since each period t can then be identified with a unique cohort. In Section 6, we discuss an extension to all games in which there is a uniform upper bound L on the length of life of all individuals in the model.
The individual decision makers who inhabit F and G in period t are denoted by F t and
denote the action profile in period t, and the two countries' per-period payoffs by π F (a t ) and π G (a t ), respectively.
Individuals care not only about their per-period payoffs, but about the long-run future payoff of their country as well. Note that since each country is populated by separate in-dividuals through time, the degree by which future payoffs are taken into account can be interpreted as the degree of "altruism" that individuals exhibit towards future individuals in their own country. This is modeled using standard geometric weights, so that given a stream of per-period payoffs, the time t continuation payoffs to F t and G t , including both the present and the future components can be written as footprint is set, it remains as given through time.
Regarding (ii) the intra-dynastic message, let m t i denote the private message received by the individual in dynasty i = F, G at the start of period t. To start things off, m 0 i is the null message, and for t ≥ 1, message m t i is sent by the individual in dynasty i in cohort t − 1 to his dynastic successor in cohort t. The message space M t i may be, but need not be, the set of action histories h t .
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The timing within each period is as follows. An individual from dynasty i = F, G, first observes the evidence s t and his private message m 
Equilibrium
In every period t, the t-action strategies determine the actions of individuals F t and G t as a function of what they have observed at the beginning of the period. Formally, for each dynasty i = F, G, the t-action strategy is expressed as α
The individual's t-message strategy determines the messages sent to his successor individual at the end of the period. His t-message strategy is expressed as µ One can distinguish between beginning-of-period-t beliefs and end-of-period-t beliefs of individuals F t and G t . For an individual t in dynasty i, the beginning-of-period belief
is a probability distribution over the entire set of past action and message his- 
given one's message, the evidence, and also the action profile taken in date t. As is standard, a system of beliefs b refers to an array of beliefs of all individuals in all periods.
We refer to the pair (f , b) as an equilibrium of the model if and only if it constitutes a Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) of the dynastic game. Sequential Equilibrium is generally accepted as one of the (if not the) benchmark equilibrium concepts for dynamic games of incomplete information. Sequential Equilibrium requires that strategies of all individuals must be sequentially rational given the equilibrium beliefs. Just as importantly, it also requires that equilibrium beliefs b must be recoverable as the limit of beliefs entirely determined by Bayes' rule using "fully mixed" perturbations of the equilibrium strategies. This is more than a technical condition. Intuitively, it means that all individuals share a complete philosophy about how other individuals' mistakes or trembles rationalize off-path events. Section 3 below demonstrates how the theory makes critical use of this "shared philosophy" to generate frequent all out wars.
Frequent All Out Wars: A Result
Our first and main result is that it is possible in equilibrium for the two countries F and G to be caught in a perpetual cycle of frequent all out wars. Proposition 1. Arbitrarily Frequent All Out Wars: Fix any positive integer N . Then there exists a pair (f , b) which: (i) is an equilibrium for any δ sufficiently close to 1 and for any precision level γ ∈ [0, 1), and (ii) is such that the action profile (W, W ) is played N − 1 times out of any N consecutive periods.
Proposition 1 asserts that catastrophic conflict resulting in below-minmax long run payoffs can occur in equilibrium. The argument, given in three basic steps, follows along the lines of the intuition outlined in the Introduction. The rough idea is that a self-protective (minmax) action may not be taken by the current decision maker after a prior deviation by his dynasty if his belief about whether the deviation occurred is incorrect. Our task in the proof is to construct an equilibrium strategy profile f = (α, µ) in which this is the case. This is done in
Step 1. The external appearance of the equilibrium in Step 1 is standard. Namely, there are three phases: an "equilibrium" phase, and a "punishment phase" for each i = F, G following a unilateral deviation that came most recently from within dynasty i. However, because the equilibrium phase results in below-minmax long run payoffs, the individuals' beliefs following off-path messages are critical.
Step 2 describes these beliefs b and establishes the consistency property, namely that these beliefs are obtained as the limit from a sequence of completely mixed trembles on the strategy profile. Finally, Step 3 establishes sequential rationality of the equilibrium, i.e., deviations are not profitable after any history for δ close to one.
Step 1. Construction of the equilibrium profile f = (α, µ). Fix N as in Proposition 1.
Before proceeding with the formal definition, the action strategy profile α is first described heuristically in terms of its continuation phases. These are depicted in a schematic way in Figure 1 . The determination of which phase the players are in depends on the messages to be specified shortly. The "equilibrium" phase consists of an infinite repetition of an N -period cycle. In each such cycle, the first N − 1 periods are classified as "war periods." These war periods are followed by a single "peace period." The cycle then repeats ad infinitum.
10 A "punishment phase" for i consists of T rounds (with T finite) of a similar type of cycle as in the equilibrium phase. As in the equilibrium phase, each cycle lasts N periods with the first N − 1 periods classified as "war periods." The difference here is that the prescribed behavior in the "peace period" that follows is different than in the peace periods of the equilibrium phase. We now describe exactly "who does what" in each phase.
According to Figure 1 , in every war period regardless of phase, the profile W W is chosen.
The two countries start off in the equilibrium phase during which the cooperative action pair CC is chosen in peace periods. They remain in this phase unless a "deviation" (yet to be described) occurs. If individual F t deviates from the prescriptions of the equilibrium, then the F-punishment phase starts (or re-starts, as appropriate) at which time the pair CD (recall that F is the row player) is chosen in the peace periods. Similarly, any deviation by any individual G t starts (or re-starts, as appropriate) the G-punishment phase in which DC is chosen in the peace periods. Double deviations are ignored. Each of these phases, if no subsequent deviations occur, lasts until the next T peace periods have passed, after which time the two countries return to the equilibrium phase.
The formal definitions of action and message strategies are as follows. We start by defining the message space. For all periods t ≥ T N − 1, the message space is the same for each dynasty i = F, G and is given by
At the beginning of each period, messages in M i determine the place in each phase. The message m * is the equilibrium phase message. The message m F ,τ indicates an F-punishment phase message in which there are τ cycles remaining in the punishment phase. Intuitively, the index τ = T, T − 1, . . . , 1 is used to "count down" the remaining peace periods that must pass before the F punishment phase ends. 11 A symmetric description applies to m G,τ .
For the first N T − 1 periods these message spaces have superfluous messages because not enough periods have elapsed since the game started at t = 0. Consequently, one would have to "shrink" the message spaces for these periods in order to have only meaningful messages.
We omit the details.
In all that follows, we define the strategy for F with the understanding that G's strategy is completely symmetric. The prescriptions of α F and µ F will not vary with the signal s t in any way.
The action strategy α F is defined as follows. In all war periods t > 0, and for any message
In words, the prescribed action in all war periods in all phases is the same. Namely, α F prescribes W in every war period, regardless of the phase. Hence, the only difference between on-path and off-path phases is in the prescribed peace-time behavior.
Here and throughout the rest, we treat the initial null message m 0 F as equal to m * . Next, for any peace period t ≥ 0 let
Hence, α F prescribes that in peace periods, the individual chooses C in both the equilibrium phase and the F-punishment phase. He chooses D in the G-punishment phase.
We now define the message strategy µ F for dynasty F as follows. Intuitively, the messages "truthfully" indicate to the next player how and when to switch between phases. First, let t > 0 be any war period. Then for any message-signal pair, (m
In war periods, F t passes on the existing message if W W is observed (or if both individuals deviate from W ). Otherwise, F t 's message indicates the beginning of a punishment phase for a deviator.
Next suppose that t ≥ 0 is a peace period. For any realized signal s t+1 , the message strategy is described in each of the three phases as follows. First, in the equilibrium phase we have
In words, an individual who received m * sends message m F ,T (resp., m G,T ) to his successor if a unilateral action deviation by F t (resp., G t ) is observed during a peace period. Next, in the G-punishment phase,
to his successor if no action deviation is observed in peace period t. If τ = 1 then the G-punishment phase is ending, and so he sends m * . Action deviations simply (re)start a punishment phase. Finally, in the F-punishment phase, F t 's strategy is symmetric to that in the G-phase.
Step 2. Construction of beliefs b. Recall that we defined the beginning-of-period belief 
Consistency. Consistency of all these beliefs is established as follows. Recall, first, that consistency entails that beliefs are obtained in the limit of a sequence of completely mixed strategies defined by "trembles" on the prescribed strategy profile f . We first describe the trembles formally and then give an intuitive account of their meaning.
Formally, the trembles are all expressed in terms of a common variable ε to be shrunk to zero as follows. The trembles at the two different action and message stages remain of course distinct. The difference between them is identified by the power to which ε is raised in each case. Whenever the equilibrium prescribes an action different from D, then D is actually played with probability ε 2 . Whenever the equilibrium prescribes an action different from W in period t, W is actually played with probability ε t+3 t+2 . Whenever the equilibrium prescribes an action different from C in period t, C is actually played with probability ε t+3 t+2 . The probability that any F t (resp G t ) sends any message m F ,τ (resp m G,τ ) when instead m * is prescribed by the equilibrium strategies is ε. The probability of all other messages being sent instead of any other equilibrium ones is ε 4 .
Intuitively, the most common interpretation, one that we adopt here, is that trembles occur due to small errors at either the action stage or the message stage. Hence, consider an individual F t who receives an off-the-equilibrium-path message m, at the beginning of the period. He must weigh several (infinitesimally unlikely) possibilities. He could have received m when play is in fact in the equilibrium phase and individual F t−1 mistakenly sent message m instead of m * . Alternatively, he could have received m because some previous individual mistakenly took the wrong action during the equilibrium phase. Given the trembles described above, if a G-punishment phase message m G,τ is observed, then individual F t 's beliefs is the limit of a sequence where a message error is of order strictly less than that of an action error. In the limit, F t therefore believes (with probability one) that message m G,τ correctly reveals that play is in the G-punishment phase. However, if m F ,τ is observed, then F t 's beliefs is the limit of a sequence where a message error is of order strictly larger than that of an action error. Specifically, he believes that his predecessor erred in sending m F ,τ and that the equilibrium phase is, in fact, the true phase.
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A similar reasoning applies to end-of-period beliefs. If at the end of the period and given his received message, individual F t observes an unexpected action by his rival then in all circumstances except one, he attributes it to an action error by G t , rather than a message error by a predecessor. The one exception is where he observes the unexpected action D by his rival in any peace period of the F-phase. In that case, and recalling his beginningof-period beliefs in that phase, he learns that m F ,τ was not, in fact, a mistaken message as he had earlier believed. For if m F ,τ was, in fact, a mistake, then F t should have observed action C played by G t . Since instead G t played D, and the trembles we use imply that it is more likely that action D is an equilibrium response by G t rather than a further deviation, he should not believe that his predecessor's message was wrong.
Notice that in the construction, beliefs are always updated from trembles of different orders. Certain off-path actions are infinitesimals of lower or higher order than certain messages, depending on the conditioning event. For this reason, the beliefs of all individuals F t and G t are degenerate in the sense that they always assign probability one to a particular past history of messages and actions, both on and off the equilibrium path. Since the beliefs are degenerate in this sense while, at the same time, the per period signals have full support, it is easy to see that the belief system b does not depend on signal realizations in any way.
Step 3. Incentives. From the constructions in Steps 1 and 2, observe that neither beliefs nor strategies depend on signal realizations (i.e., the evidence) in any way. Hence, in what follows, we omit the signals from the notation and consider the incentives of an individual
We examine all incentive constraints supposing that t is a peace period. Once equilibrium incentives in peace periods have been established, incentives in war periods can be easily checked since (a) punishment only occurs during peace periods, and (b) because the 12 One can see why such beliefs are plausible. They belong to a population of individuals who have inherent difficulty in accepting blame/fault/responsibility for their own group's role in a long standing conflict. It's a good deal easier to believe that fault lies with the other group. Clearly, one could envision alternative error structures for different societies. Each would have different implications for equilibrium actions and payoffs sustained on path. Action incentives. Since t is a peace period, then the construction of (f , b) in Steps 1 and 2
Notice that the payoff to individual F t after receiving the message m F ,τ is as it would be in the equilibrium phase. This is because he believes G t received m * from his predecessor G t−1 . Remember, however, that in the F-punishment phase his assessment is incorrect. The actual profile in peace period t is CD rather than CC. The "after-the-fact" learning discussed at the end of Step 2 occurs for decision makers in peace periods. Hence, the end-of-period
for the equilibrium and G-punishment phases, respectively. However, in the F-phase,
. This is because F t learns the truth after observing action profile CD in period t, but he cannot communicate this to his successor F t+1 who instead interprets F t 's message as an error.
It is not hard to check that for any τ = 1, . . . , T ,
and that U t−1 The precise calculations of all for these payoffs are tedious though not hard to carry out given the war-and-peace cycle. For instance, in any peace period t, With this we conclude the argument.
Social Memory, Messages, and Evidence
The logic of the result highlights the critical roles of private, intra-dynastic messages and the error structure on those messages and actions. In the next few subsections, we re-examine these roles in more detail and ask whether and to what extent the particular features of our equilibrium are essential to sustaining below-minmax payoffs.
All Out War and Private Communication
Social memory hinges on information transmission through time. How important is the private communication between one generation of individuals and the next in sustaining frequent all out wars? Consider the dynastic game with messages taken out entirely. Then, for every t, the long-run continuation payoffs in (2) cannot be below the minmax payoff for either F or G. Therefore the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no longer viable.
This follows from the fact that, with messages taken out the dynastic game is easily seen to be equivalent to a repeated game with "imperfect public monitoring" (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, 1994) in which individuals are forbidden from using "private strategies." 14 Every "perfect public equilibrium" in Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) yields long-run payoffs that cannot be below a player's minmax payoff. Hence, in our case not below the minmax payoffs π F (DW ) and π G (W D), respectively.
Messages Versus Evidence
Proposition 1 is false if the evidence s t is perfectly informative about the past history of action profiles. In this case social memory must be correct. In particular, if we set γ = 1, the long-run continuation payoffs in (2) cannot be below the minmax for either F or G. Therefore the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no longer viable.
To see why this is true we can proceed by induction in the following way. Individuals From the insensitivity of beliefs to messages we have just shown we can then deduce that when the evidence s t is perfectly informative, the model must behave in the same way as the model with private messages taken out entirely.
16 This, as we saw above, implies that the long-run continuation payoffs in (2) can never be below the minmax for either country.
On the other hand, things change dramatically if γ < 1. We remarked already that the beliefs of individuals F t and G t in the equilibrium in Proposition 1 do not depend on the realization of the observed evidence s t . This is neither necessary nor sufficient to gener- (2002)). By this definition, q t i could be incorrect even though it varies with the signal s t . Alternatively, q t i could be full and correct even though it does not vary with the signal. This is because the messages from one generation to the next can in principle convey all available information about the past history of action profiles.
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Intuitively, equilibrium beliefs can be independent of the evidence from the past as in the equilibrium in Proposition 1 because the messages are sent after individuals F t and G t observe the actual play in period t, and hence, in principle, can convey the true record of play. Physical evidence, on the other hand, cannot possibly contain all information about what happened in the past. It is then possible that the individuals place sufficiently more trust in the messages than in the physical evidence and effectively ignore the latter. In a sense, it is precisely because messages can in principle noiselessly encode the actual history that they may entirely override the evidence in the equilibrium beliefs. We view this as an appealing and realistic attribute of the model. 16 The argument here becomes a little more involved than our intuitive description suggests. This is because upon receiving different messages, an individual may take different actions even though his beliefs are the same. However, this difficulty can be circumvented noting that, since his beliefs are the same, he must be indifferent between the different actions he takes. 17 It is in fact possible to construct "truthful" equilibria in which all information about the past history of play is correctly conveyed from one set of individuals to the next. The perturbations that must be used to construct the individuals beliefs in such equilibria are far from "natural." In essence full truthfulness requires that a single message mistake be infinitely less likely than an unbounded number of action mistakes combined.
Imperfect Current Monitoring
In light of our previous discussion of messages versus evidence, we consider the following modification of the model. In each period individuals F t and G t , after choosing their action at t, no longer observe the opponent's action at t while they still observe the imperfect public signal p t of the action pair taken at t, as before. All other details of the model are unchanged.
Refer to this modified model as one of imperfect current monitoring.
Under imperfect current monitoring, physical evidence is the main engine behind equilibrium behavior. Crucially, this is reflected in the impossibility of social memory that is systematically wrong. In fact there is a well defined sense in which under imperfect current monitoring social memory must be effectively correct.
Given any t ≤ t − 1, it will be convenient to denote by q
the probability distributions over action profiles in periods t, . . . , t − 1 only implied by (the
describes a full history of actions and messages up to and including the action stage of t − 1.
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We wish to consider histories that follow h t + , assuming no further deviations after the action stage of t − 1. Let e t (h t + , s t ) be the actual equilibrium distribution over action profiles in periods t, . . . , t − 1, following h t + , given the evidence s t .
The following result shows in essence that with imperfect current monitoring after any history, on or off path, the two countries' social memory can only differ from the actual equilibrium distribution over action profiles in a payoff irrelevant way.
In the following Proposition, two equilibria are said to be equivalent if they have the same payoff continuations to each player after every history.
Proposition 2. Correct Social Memory: Fix any precision level γ ∈ [0, 1). Any pure strategy sequential equilibrium (f ,b) under imperfect current monitoring is equivalent to an equilibrium (f ,b) with the following properties: (i) neither the beliefs nor the strategies of any individual depend on his message received (ii) given any t and any history h t + as above, for every t > t and s t then q
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A formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. According to its statement, under imperfect current monitoring, any equilibrium is equivalent to one in which the social memory 18 So far we have used the notation h t to indicate a history of action profiles from 0 to t − 1. We are now using a subscript "+" to indicate a history of both action and message profiles. 19 In light of (i), we drop message m in the arguments of beliefs q
of both countries about previous action profiles chosen after t must be correct. Our claim is surprising in the following sense. Going from the dynastic game we considered before to the one with imperfect current monitoring we degrade the individuals' information about the current action profile. Yet, as a result we find that the equilibrium has the same payoffs after any history as one in which strategies and beliefs do not vary with messages. Moreover, the individuals' assessments of the history of play qualitatively improves in the sense that it cannot be systematically wrong.
This contrasts with our original model where social memory can fail to predict even the actions of the individuals who follow their equilibrium strategies. To give an example, consider the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Let h t + be defined as before such that there is one and only one deviation. At the end of periodt − 2, individual Ft −2 sends some message m G,τ instead of m * as prescribed. Suppose that all the players in periodst − 1,t, . . .
play according to the equilibrium of Proposition 1. According to the equilibrium, the action profile will eventually lock into DD in future peace periods. However, every player in period t >t − 1 assigns probability zero to the event that DD has ever been played before t. In other words, the individuals living after periodt−1 are systematically wrong about the action profiles played in the peace periods aftert − 1.
It is worth explicitly making the following observation about imperfect current monitoring.
Using the same logic as in Section 4.1, one can show the following. Fix any precision level γ ∈ [0, 1) and consider the model with imperfect current monitoring. Consider any pure strategy equilibrium. Then the long-run payoff to both countries cannot be below the minmax payoff.
Therefore the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no longer viable. In this sense, degrading the information that individuals have about actions currently taken makes both countries better off.
It is legitimate to ask what happens if we allow for a current signal that is imperfect but with a higher level of precision than those concerning past actions; an intermediate case between our baseline model of Section 2 and the imperfect current monitoring case considered in this section. In this case, it is not too hard to show, using examples, that equilibrium behavior can indeed depend on messages in a non-trivial way that allows for equilibrium payoffs that are not available in the standard repeated game with infinitely-lived players. Whether in the limit as δ approaches 1 payoffs below the minmax can be sustained is an open question at this point.
Relation to the Literature
Earlier, we compared this model to other models of war. Unlike most of the literature, this paper analyzes conflicts so destructive as to deny participants the usual modicum of self protection (inherent in the minmax outcome). We examine the role of social memory in generating these types of conflicts.
As far as we know, ours is the only dynastic game model that deals specifically with issues of war and social memory. There are other dynastic game models of communication:
Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005), Kobayashi (2007) , Lagunoff and Matsui (2004) , and AGL.
However, they have a different focus. Their interest is in characterizing the broadest possible equilibrium set rather than in either war or social memory. Indeed, because physical evidence is absent from those models, they cannot address the questions we pose here on whether/how social memory incorporates tangible evidence alongside private messages.
20
There are, however, two other papers that bear mentioning because they deal with "memory" and conflict, albeit in very different settings. Glaeser (2005) models the political economy of group hatred. In his model, "entrepreneurial" politicians can supply hate-creating stories as a signal of an out-group's threat to the rest of the uninformed citizenry. Verifying these stories is costly, and so a politician's partially revealing (i.e., mixed) strategy leads the citizens to put more weight in their beliefs on the truthfulness of these stories. Dessí (2008) studies the role of collective memory when individuals' investment decisions exhibit spillovers. She models the problem of an informed principal (the older generation) who selectively informs two younger agents about the value of a noisy signal of the past. Though her model is not about war per se, the negative spillovers create conflicts among the young, and therefore must be endogenously controlled by the principal who chooses to selectively withhold some information.
The present model differs from these and, in our view, contributes to the literature in one critical respect. In our case a society's history has no direct effect on current payoffs. In game theoretic parlance, there are no payoff types. While an individual's private information affects his beliefs about past history, it does not reflect any fundamentals. This distinction is not inconsequential. For instance, in Glaeser's model, there must be some states of the world, arising with positive probability, in which the out-group really is dangerous in order for citizens to believe this even when the out-group is, in fact, not dangerous. Our results 20 One other critical difference is that the results of the prior papers do not apply to the case of two dynasties.
hold without the presence of payoff types: destructive forces can be unleashed even when there is no objective danger to the current generation in any state of the world. This is noteworthy, because even in the larger literature on endogenous "memory" that deals non-war issues, the signals are either tangible, costly, or both. Clearly, the literature on herding falls into this category. For this massive literature we refer the reader to surveys on herding by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) and Gale (1996) , and the work of Ahn and Suominen (2001) , Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) , Jackson and Kalai (1999) and Moscarini, Ottaviani, and Smith (1998) .
Among the intergenerational models more closely aligned to our framework, Bisin and Verdier (2001) At the same time, when people become convinced that economic success depends on effort, they vote for a regime of low taxes and redistribution. Because of the complementarities, there are two equilibria: an optimistic "American" equilibrium with laissez-faire public policy, and a pessimistic "European" equilibrium with a more extensive welfare state.
We emphasize that, just as in Glaeser (2005)'s and Dessí (2008)'s frameworks, individual memory in these models is derived from tangible or costly signals. The signal need not be an asset that has value but can, nevertheless, effectively encode an individual's past behavior (Johnson, Levine, and Pesendorfer, 2001, Kandori, 1992b) . Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2003) , Kocherlakota (1998) , Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) and Wallace (2001) show how fiat money, for example, plays this role.
Finally, we note that the present results are roughly consistent with a number of unusual findings in lab experiments designed to capture intergenerational environments. Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher (2009) and Sopher (2003, 2007) show that word-of-mouth learning is a stronger force for perpetuating conventions, good or bad, than simply having access to the historical record. In related experiments, Duffy and Feltovich (2005) report that word-of-mouth communication frequently makes things worse than observing history alone. Obviously, the link between theory and the experiments is imperfect. Nevertheless, their findings largely accord with our results, provided that subjects are never absolutely certain that the historical evidence they receive is exact. They also help in understanding the demonstrable effect that private versus public communication has for sustaining bad outcomes found by Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher (2009) .
Conclusion
This paper studies the role of social memory in creating and sustaining conflicts. Social memory is embodied in a society's vicarious beliefs about the past. These beliefs are shaped by both intergenerational communication and the imperfect physical evidence from the past. To formalize it entails a detailed model of the intergenerational communication within dynastic societies.
We show that there exist equilibria in a canonical Game of Conflict in which "all out war" occurs with arbitrarily high frequency. In these equilibria physical evidence is ignored and, in fact, beliefs of one or both parties can be incorrect after certain events.
Significantly, these equilibria can occur despite the fact that there are no objective states of the world in which the conflict is desirable from anyone's point of view. These outcomes could not be attained in a standard infinitely repeated game. Because messages can, in principle, convey more information than any imperfectly informative physical evidence, there are equilibria in which the current generation focuses only on the messages. Ironically, social memory can be incorrect precisely because it relies on sources that can be more informative than hard evidence.
A few issues bear mentioning here. The first concerns robustness with respect to the demographic structure. We initially assumed a "canonical demographic" whereby there is full replacement within each dynasty ever period. However, using a technique known at least since Ellison (1994) , one can show that our results are fairly robust to the demographic structure.
Specifically, it turns out that any equilibrium of the model with canonical demographics has a corresponding equilibrium of a model in which replacement within a dynasty can occur at any time provided that there is a uniform upper bound L on individuals' lifetimes. The idea is to construct L interleaved "copies" of the equilibrium with canonical demographics. 21 Here, the strategies and beliefs of individuals alive in periods 0, L, 2L, 3L and so on, "match" the strategies of the individuals alive in periods 0, 1, 2, 3 and so on in the model with full replacement every period. Matching here means that when deciding how to play, the individuals alive at L will only consider information concerning period 0, individuals alive at 2L will only consider information concerning periods 0 and L and so on, forward without bound. 22 The same construction is used to match the strategies and beliefs of individuals alive in periods 1, L + 1, 2L + 1, 3L + 1 and so on with those of the individuals alive in periods 0, 1, 2, 3 and so on in the model with full replacement every period. It is fairly straightforward in this generalized model to show that for any equilibrium of the model with canonical demographics and discount factor δ, the construction outlined here yields an equilibrium for the L-bounded demographics case for a discount factor of δ 1 L .
Second, we have focused our attention entirely on "bad" equilibria with frequent all out wars. The implication is that wrong social memory is a bad thing. But there is a flip-side to this which highlights the possible "good" consequences of wrong social memory. Precisely because very bad payoffs can be sustained on path, these payoffs can be used as "punishments" off it. We have examples that show that the cooperative outcome CC can be sustained in equilibrium for a lower δ in the dynastic game than in the standard repeated game if γ is low. The construction is not as straightforward as it might look at first sight since one cannot simply "plug in" -say -the equilibrium of Proposition 1 as a punishment phase of another equilibrium in which CC is sustained. The reason is that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is viable for a high δ in the first place.
Whether cooperation can in general be sustained more easily in the dynastic game is an open question at this point. The question of how the possibility of inaccurate social memory might lead to the emergence of better equilibria is clearly both interesting and potentially important. We leave this issue for future research.
21 The same would be true if we considered the case where the L-bounded demographics are stochastic in the sense that no individual lives more than L periods with probability one. The same technique would also allow us to use the model with canonical demographics to handle demographics with overlapping generations of individuals within a dynasty. The details are well beyond the scope of this paper. 22 Clearly, in the model with the L-bounded demographics, the messages sent must be constructed so that the relevant information is passed along (unused) via the intervening individuals. beliefs of F t about dynasty G must be as in the first case, in which F t observes s t and the equilibrium m t F = m(t, s t ). At the end of period t, since we are in the imperfect current monitoring case, it must also be the case that F t assigns probability one to individual G t having played a G (t, s t ) and having sent m G (t + 1, s t ) to his successor G t+1 .
Comparing the first and second case we just considered, it is apparent that the beliefs of F t on path concerning the history of actions and messages taken by dynasty G do not depend on m t F .
Step 2. In this Step, we construct a new equilibrium (f ,b) from the original one, and then argue that (a) it is equivalent to the original equilibrium in the sense that it delivers the same beginning and end of period payoffs after every history of play; and (b) in this new equilibrium, neither the message or action strategies nor the beliefs of any individual depend on the message he receives.
To getf fromf we set the behavior of all individuals after any off-path message to be the same as if they had instead observed the equilibrium message. As a consequence, underf the behavior of all individuals (at the action and the message stage) does not depend on the message they receive.
To getb fromb we set the beliefs of all individuals after any off-path message to be the same as if they had instead observed the equilibrium message. As a consequence, underb the beliefs of all individuals do not depend on the message they receive.
Clearly, by construction of (f ,b), neither the message or action strategies nor the beliefs of any individual depend on the message he receives.
It remains to argue that (f ,b) is in fact an equilibrium and that it is equivalent to (f ,b) in the sense of (a) above. It is convenient to argue the latter first. As before, we focus on dynasty F. The details for dynasty G are symmetric.
Given the argument in Step 1, it must be that going from (f ,b) to (f ,b) the beliefs of any individual F t about the history of actions and messages for dynasty G are the same in the two equilibria.
Since following the receipt of an on-path message the strategies are the same across the two equilibria, there is clearly nothing to prove in this case.
Consider then an on-path and an off-path message for the same s t in the original equilibrium (f ,b). That is consider F t and two information sets, an on-path one given by s t and m t F = m F (t, s t ), and the other given by the same s t and any off-path message m t F = m F (t, s t ). At these two information sets, and at all the ones following them after s t+1 is realized, the beliefs of F t about dynasty G must also be the same. But this implies that the continuation expected payoff of F t must be the same at these two information sets and at those following them after s t+1 is realized. Because of the way we constructed (f ,b) from (f ,b), this is clearly enough to show that the two equilibria are equivalent.
To see that (f ,b) is in fact an equilibrium, we need to verify two things. The first is that the strategies specified byf are sequentially rational givenb, and the second is that the beliefsb are admissible for a Sequential Equilibrium. Sequential rationality is a simple consequence of the fact that (f ,b) is an equilibrium and of how we constructed (f ,b) from it. If sequential rationality failed at any information set in (f ,b), then it would have to fail (on path) at a corresponding information set in (f ,b). Lastly, to check that the beliefsb have the requisite properties is a routine exercise. It is enough to assume that message deviations are sufficiently "more likely" than deviations at the action stage. We omit the details.
